This paper develops a theoretical framework to analyze the variability in Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval decisions among competing industries including those that produce new brand-name drugs, generic drugs, and medical devices. The theory provides a framework to empirically test for the determinants of FDA approval decisions. These determinants include the agency's budget, congressional preferences and several proxies for both industry interests and consumer interests. Results from the analysis suggest that the agency's response to these determinants varies among the three different industry approval activities. The pattern of variation implies that bureaucratic discretion is the highest for products with the greatest regulatory stringency. This variation in agency responsiveness further suggests that no single theory of regulation can explain the agency's approval decisions among the three industries. Instead, different theories of regulation, such as public interest, capture or congressional control, are needed to explain different industry approval activities.
Introduction
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is a key institution in the markets it regulates.
The approval decisions made by this agency determine the set of brand-name drugs, generic drugs and medical devices available to consumers and also determine the distribution of benefits and costs to firms of marketing their products in the U.S. For these reasons, it is important to understand the factors to which the agency responds and how these factors may influence agency approval decisions. FDA approval decisions exhibit significant variability among brand-name drugs, generic drugs, and medical device industries. For example, in 1973, 50 new brand-name drugs and 295 generic drugs were approved while in 1988, 68 new brand-name drugs and 650 generic drugs were approved. In 1990, 69 new brand-name drugs were approved while only 80 generic drugs were approved. What factors explain such variability ?
There is little consensus in the academic literature regarding the objective of regulators. Various theories of agency behavior suggest that congress, industry interest groups and consumer welfare play a part in agency decision-making. However, there is a relatively limited number of empirical studies which examine agency decision-making.' Few studies have attempted to test among the competing theories of agency behavior. This paper develops a theoretical framework to analyze the variability in FDA approval decisions among competing industries and empirically identifies key determinants of agency approval decisions. The analysis also provides insight as to which theories of agency behavior may explain FDA approval activity.
The theoretical framework suggests that regulatory agencies respond to a diverse set of external interests including congress, industry groups, and consumer groups. The responsiveness of the agency to these interests depends on the regulated product, the stringency of regulation, and the potential for adverse feedback from congress, the industry or consumers.
An example of such adverse feedback from consumers would be the general public's reaction to the approval of a harmful drug. An example of adverse feedback from congress could be a cut in the agency's budget. The differences in agency responsiveness to these external interests produces the observed variability in its industry approval decisions.
1 One exception is a particularly extensive study of EPA decision-making is conducted by Magat, Krupnick and Harrington. Results from the empirical analysis suggest that FDA budgetary restrictions have a constraining effect on generic drug approvals, but do not constrain either brand-name drug or medical device approvals. In addition, congressional preferences appear to play a relatively significant role in the number of generic drug approvals. These results may suggest that while theories of congressional control may apply to the approval of generic drugs, the approval of brand-name drugs and medical devices, which have the most stringent approval requirements, entail a relatively high degree of agency discretion. 2 FDA approval activities are also found to vary in their responsiveness to industry interests. For example, results suggest that the FDA is more responsive to the employment outlook in the medical device industry than in the brand-name drug industry. The FDA also appears more responsive to generic industry demand than to brand-name industry demand for product approval. Some additional results suggest that the FDA is very responsive to proxies representing consumer interests for both brand-name drug and generic drug approvals; however, further work is needed to investigate this relationship more carefully.
The variation in the responsiveness of the FDA's approval activities to these external interests further suggests that no single theory of regulation can explain the behavior of this agency. Instead, different theories of regulation may be appropriate for different industry approval activities. For agencies that regulate different industries, analyses need to examine the relationship between specific agency actions and the set of external interests that are predominantly affected by these actions. Then, within such an agency, it may be possible to find behavior consistent with several competing theories of regulation.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides some background on industry demand for FDA product approval, agency resources and FDA regulations across the different industries. A subsection 2.1 discusses some existing theories of regulatory agency behavior. A model of the interaction between the agency and congress is presented in section 3. The specification for the empirical test and a discussion of the data is given in section 4. Section 5 presents the results and section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
2 The results help explain why brand-name drug firms opposed FDA budget increases following the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act in 1984 and why brand-name firms have opposed user fees for FDA services over the last decade. In effect, any measure which relaxes FDA budget constraints will increase the number of generic drugs approved without necessarily increasing the numbers of brand-name drug approvals. 
Industry Demand and FDA Regulatory Services
The pharmaceutical and medical device industries have experienced substantial growth over the last twenty years. The innovative pharmaceuticals available today represent significant quality-enhancing improvements and are only distant cousins to past drug treatments. As documented by Weisbrod (1991) New Drug Application (ANDA) to expedite their approval. While the approval process for brand-name drugs can take up to 12 years, approval for generic drugs generally occurs in a fraction of this time. Pre-market approval procedures for select medical devices were first established by the 1976 Medical Device Amendments; however, a substantial number of medical devices remain exempt from this process. 5 The class of devices requiring premarket approval represents a small but growing set. Most devices fall into a category which requires only pre-market notification know as a 510(k) requirement.' Even after controlling for the differences in regulatory stringency; however, there still exists significant unexplained variability in FDA decision-making over time. 
Theories of Agency Behavior
Various theories of agency behavior have been proposed, but there is little consensus regarding agency objectives and the sources of influence over agency decision-making. The congressional dominance theory introduced by Weingast and Moran (1983) suggests that Congress has the rewards and sanctions necessary to control agency behavior and for this 5 In fact, the classification of all medical devices as specified in the 1976 Medical Device Amendments was not completed until 1982.
6 A 510(k) requires that manufacturers of a device establish substantial equivalence in terms of safety and effectiveness to a medical device already legally marketed in the United States. 5 reason, agency actions generally reflect the preferences of the corresponding Congressional oversight committees. 7 Their theory was shown to have predictive power at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) as the measures of congressional preferences, particularly subcommittee preferences, were found to be significant determinants of FTC case selection.
An alternative theory proposed by Moe (1985) suggests that the agency has a greater degree of autonomy in its relationship with congress due to its superior information regarding its regulatory activities and its internal organization. Given the complex hierarchy within bureaucratic agencies, many of the career bureaucrats working in the agency are less responsive to pressures from congress. In addition, Moe suggests that the president, various presidential appointments and the courts had an important role in determining policy at the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
These papers have very different perspectives regarding the relationship between congress and the bureaucracy. A problem associated with the evaluation of these theories is the lack of a specification for an agency's objective function. What are the forces that agencies respond to and why do agencies choose the actions that they do? The public interest theory of regulation suggests that agencies take action to maximize consumer benefits. Niskanen (1971) has suggested that an agency head acts to maximize his or her expected budget from congress. A study by Baron and Besanko (1984) examining the relationship between a regulator and a regulated firm assumes that the regulator or agency maximizes some weighted sum of consumer and producer surplus. The capture theory presented by Stigler (1971) suggests that regulatory agencies take actions which maximize the benefits to the industry it regulates.
A very convenient and general formulation of a regulator's objective function is the external signals model introduced by Joskow (1974 ), No11 (1985 , and Magat, Krupnick and Harrington (1986) . The external signals theory suggests that an agency chooses its actions u(p, b, e) as a function of the congressional policy p and congressional resources, budget b and employees e, to maximize the sum of positive feedback received from a variety of external sources i = 1, . . . . m including the regulated industry, consumer groups, congress or 7 The theory also predicts that we will see infrequent congressional oversight because the agency is aware of the consequences of deviating from committee preferences. 6 the professions from which the agency staff is drawn. 
T h e M o d e l
This section describes a theory of the relationship between congress and the regulatory agency which draws upon the external signals model discussed above and a model of congressional delegation by Bawn (1992) . The model represents a two-stage game in which congress chooses regulatory policies pr and p2 in the first stage for competing industries regulated by a single agency. Congress also chooses the budget b, and staff e for the agency prior to any agency actions. In the second stage, the agency chooses its actions ar (pi,pz, b, e) and az (pr,pz, b, e) as a function of the policies and resources set by congress. The extent to which agency actions ai deviates from congressional policy pi represents the degree of bureaucratic discretion exercised by the agency with respect to activity i. Note that the agency actions in any one area ui(.) may be influenced by all congressional policies affecting the agency. In the case of drug regulation, this implies that the number of new brand-name drug approvals is a function of brand-name drug policy as well as generic drug policy.
For simplicity, the author assumes that a congressional policy enacting coalition exists and the preferences of this coalition regarding the two policies are represented by ideal points B,r and 8,2. For example, such a coalition may reflect the preferences of the relevant congressional oversight committee regarding agency policies. The coalition chooses pl , p2, b and e to maximize its objective function:
We) - C(al(pl,p2,b,e),ii2(pl,p2,b,e) 
I
After congressional policies and resources are selected, the agency chooses its actions to maximize the sum of external signals as described in equation (1) subject to a resource constraint for the agency:
Equations (2)- (5) 8 The expected agency action may be based the agency's action in the previous period plus an error term. These expressions are derived from the first-order conditions of the maximization of equation (2) subject to (3). This implies that the equilibruim policy choice of congress deviates from the congressional ideal point by an amount reflecting the expected estimate of the agency's marginal cost of implementing the policy. This estimate also includes expected agency deviation from congressional policy or the level of bureaucratic discretion $$ across all agency actions. One source of agency discretion is associated with the agency's implementation of a given policy; represented by the term 2. However, a second source of discretion measures the effect of a given policy on the other actions taken by the agency;
represented by 2, i # j. This term reflects the discretionary spillover of policy pi on agency action lZj.
For example in the case of drug regulation, reducing the stringency of generic drug regulatory policy (reducing p;) may cause more generic applications to be approved z < 0; however, the change in generic drug policy may have spillover effects on the numbers of brand-name drugs. If the agency is utilizing more resources to implement the generic drug policy, this may imply that fewer resources are available to implement the other agency policies 2 > 0. Since these two effects work in opposite directions, this example implies that congressional control over agency resources can limit the aggregate amount of bureaucratic discretion.
Proposition 1 also characterizes the equilibrium budget b* and staff e*. For X = 1, the marginal opportunity cost of b* to congress is equated to the marginal value of the budget to the agency less the marginal cost of the expected agency discretion associated with that budget. Since higher budgets may enable more agency discretion, congress has another reason in addition to increasing opportunity costs for restricting an agency's budget.
Also, the marginal opportunity cost of e* to congress is equated to the marginal net value of the staff to the agency less the marginal cost of expected agency discretion associated 9 with that level of staff. Congressional incentives to restrict staff are due to both increasing opportunity costs and the prospect of increased agency discretion. For 0 < X < 1, the proposition suggests that the marginal net values of the budget and staff allocation to the agency exceed the marginal opportunity costs of these resources to congress. This is probably the more realistic case since the survival of the agency depends on its budget. These expressions are derived from the first-order conditions of the maximization of (4) subject to (5). The conditions given in Proposition 2 can be rewritten in the following form.
where MC,j is the marginal cost, g, of implementing action aj. This condition states 1 that the agency chooses its actions to equate the ratios of marginal feedback to marginal costs associated with the different agency approval actions. This result implies that the agency tries to maintain some balance among the different industry approval activities.
Congress can affect the agency's marginal cost by its design of policy and staff assigned to the agency. In the case of drugs, the marginal cost of approving a brand-name drug exceeds the marginal cost of approving a generic drug. 9 In effect, this forces the agency to take actions which generate more positive expected feedback from brand-name drug policy than from generic drug policy. If such feedback can not be obtained, the agency must alter its brand-name approval activities to lower the marginal cost associated with its actions.
Assuming that marginal cost is increasing with the number of approvals, the agency may approve fewer brand-name drugs. This example illustrates how Congress may alter the stringency of regulatory policy to limit agency actions and agency discretion.
9 Given the more stringent approval requirements for brand-name drugs, applications generally consist of extensive paperwork on clinical tests that need to be evaluated and are often difficult and confusing to interpret. Generic drugs only have to establish bioequivalency with an existing drug. Hence the applications consist of less paperwork and are often easier to evaluate. 12 The set of new brand-name drug approvals is not identical to the set of New Chemical
Entities approved. The NCE approvals are a subset of the NDAP used in the analysis.
13 With respect to medical devices, the analysis focuses on pre-market approvals instead of the 510(k) notifications. Since pre-market approval procedures for medical devices were first introduced in the 1976 Medical Device Amendments, this series has O's from 1971 up to 1976 and then has the actual approvals granted from 1977-1991. 14 The reason that FDA staff is not included in the system estimation is the high degree of correlation (very close to 1) that exists between FDA budget and FDA staff allocations over time. (MDAPt) (9) Given the interrelatedness of the above expressions, they are estimated simultaneously using two-stage least squares. In addition to the two-stage least squares, simple OLS results for (6)- (8) (6)- (9) ) is the ADA score of the median member of the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment; SADA in (6)- (9) is the ADA score of the median member of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources." The l5 Since the theory does not identify the specific signals or variables to use in the analysis, the author had to exercise some personal judgement in the selection of these exogenous variables. The variables used are considered to be reasonable proxies to identify congressional, industry and consumer feedback regarding FDA approval decisions.
16 6 The ADA scores of the Senate committee median are used instead of the subcommittee median because the Senate subcommittee which was responsible for FDA oversight was abolished in 1981 leaving jurisdiction with the full committee. The full committee median member's scores are used for consistency over the entire period.
preferences of the median committee member are used since this member is pivotal in the formation of a majority coalition in the committee."
Preferences associated with ADA scores may differ among the different industries. For instance, in the case of brand-name drug and medical device approvals, both of which require evidence of safety and efficacy, high ADA scores may be associated with a preference for consumer protection and cautious approval. For generic drug approvals, high ADA scores are associated with a preference for the rapid approval of generic drugs to increase the available supply of drugs for consumers and to increase the competition in the marketplace.
Since generic drugs are simply copies of brand-name drugs which have presumably been in the marketplace for several years, there is less need for caution.
Low ADA scores in the case of brand-name drug or medical device approval are associated with less emphasis on consumer protection and more emphasis on faster approval to reduce the regulatory cost of delay to brand-name firms. For generic drugs, low ADA scores are associated with a preference for limiting the competition among drugs in the marketplace to benefit the existing producers of drugs. In (9), high ADA scores are associated with a preference for increasing the size of the FDA's budget while low ADA scores reflect a preference for limiting the size of the FDA's regulatory budget. The coefficients for these variables will measure the extent to which congressional preferences of the relevant oversight committees influence FDA approval activities in (6)-(8) and the size of the FDA's budget in (9). 18
In each expression (6)-(8), the coefficient for the FBUD variable is another congresl7 Changes in the preferences of the median committee member also reflect changes in the overall composition or balance of interests within a committee.
l8 Another congressional variable considered was a dummy variable for the 1984 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act. This act facilitated the entry of generic drugs into the market. However, the variable when included in (7) was not significantly different from zero. The reason why this variable was not significant is that the changes in congressional preferences over the period mirror the effect of this act. Olson (1994) characterizes the change in congressional preferences leading to this legislation. To test for whether equation (7) is misspecified by omitting the 1984 policy dummy, the estimation was conducted for 1971-1984 with all the variables listed above except the generic scandal variable which took place in 1988. Then the predicted number of generic approvals was calculated using the coefficients from this estimation and compared to the actual number of generic approvals. The predicted values of generic approvals for 1985-1988 did reflect the increase observed in actual approvals following the act so excluding the 1984 policy dummy does not cause any misspecification.
sional signal (determined endogenously in (9) The third variable represents the number of applications for approval received by the FDA for new brand-name drugs NREC in (6) and for generic drugs GREC in (7). 21
The coefficients for these variables measure the extent to which current industry demand for regulatory services influences FDA approval activity. 22 Positive coefficients for these variables imply that increased applications lead to more approval activity. In the case of new brand-name drug applications, this variable represents a understatement of industry demand for FDA services because the number of applications pending at the end of the previous year should also be considered. Unfortunately, a complete data series on the number of pending applications is not available over the entire period.
To assume that the industry employment variables and the FDA applications received variables are exogenous represent somewhat restrictive assumptions. However, employment in these industries may be constrained by the rigidities introduced by the presence of labor contracts, any union agreements or existing production arrangements for already approved products. Since employment choices may be constrained by the external forces, the variable is treated as exogenous. In the case of approval applications received by the FDA, such applications are the product of many years of prior research and experimentation with the compounds. Since the application is the result of such a long-term decision process, it is also assumed to be exogenous in any given year. In addition, both employment and application decisions are also driven by competitive pressures associated with world markets.
Endogenizing these decisions requires capturing many of these other market conditions and competitive dimensions, and so is left as a topic for future research.
There are three exogenous variables which proxy for feedback from consumer groups.
Since theory did not dictate which proxies to use, the author attempted to identify a key variable of interest to a particular consumer group for each product approval category. The first variable is a proxy for the value that consumers place on the innovative pharmaceutical treatments available today. This variable actually represents the benefit to consumers as perceived by scientists or doctors at the FDA. This value is measured by the decline in the 21 A complete data series is not avaiable for medical device applications received. 22 The measure of current industry demand for approval services, as measured by current applications, understates the true demand at any given time because it does not reflect pending applications from previous years. death rate UIITH in (6) from a selected disease, particularly ulcers. 23 The ulcer death rate is thought to be representative of a disease for which innovative pharmaceuticals have produced life-saving benefits for consumers. A predicted negative coefficient for UDTH measures the extent to which improved approval decisions regarding new drugs are affected by an expectation of a reduction in death.
Regarding generic drug approvals, a primary concern for interest groups such as American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) is the cost of pharmaceutical treatments. The second consumer variable represents the degree to which the prescription pharmaceutical price index exceeds the industrial commodities price index. The variable PINDX in (7) is the ratio of the prescription price index to the industrial commodities price index. This variable is a proxy for the consumer benefits associated with having cheaper priced generic drugs. A predicted negative coefficient for PINDX suggests that generic approval decisions are favorably influenced by a expected decline in this price ratio. Finally, the third general issue for consumers is safety. The third variable is a dummy variable representing the public concern regarding the safety of generic drugs following the generic drug scandal that was uncovered in 1989. 24 This variable SCAN in (7) is 0 in all years up to and including 1988 and 1 for years following 1988. The sign of its coefficient is predicted to be negative since increased public concern should cause the FDA to exercise more caution in the approval of generic drugs.
In the expression for the FDA's budget (9), the coefficients for new drug approvals NDAP, generic approvals GNAP, and medical device approvals MDAP measure the effect of expected agency approval activities on the congressional budget allocation to the FDA.
The sign of these coefficients are ambiguous. For example, a positive coefficient for NDAP suggests that congress rewards the FDA for more new brand-name drug approvals with a higher budget. A negative coefficient on GNAP may suggest that an increase in the expected generic drug approval activities may lead to a smaller FDA budget allocation 23 Three other diseases: kidney infections, tuberculosis and cerebrovascular diseases were all very highly correlated with the death rates from ulcers over time so that using any single disease would proxy for the benefits stemming from drug therapies for the other diseases.
24 Charles Chang, a supervisory chemist at the FDA's Office of Generic Drugs, and four other FDA employees had accepted illegal payments from some generic pharmaceutical firms to speed the approval process for their respective drugs. Some of the generic firms involved were also found to have submitted falsified data to the FDA regarding their ANDA applications. from congress. This result is consistent with a congressional interest in constraining the FDA's generic approval activities by reducing the size of the agency's budget. Also in (9), the coefficient for the lagged FDA budget variable FBUDt-r measures the degree to which the current FDA budget is determined by its value in the previous year.
Its sign is expected to be positive. The coefficient for GNP in (9) measures extent to which general economic conditions affect the size of FDA budget and it's expected sign is positive.
A summary of the predicted signs for the coefficients that are not ambiguous are given in parentheses below. Since logarithms of the variables are used in the estimation, 1 is added to each entry of the dummy variable SCAN, to each entry of a series containing a zero value, and to the various rates of return to avoid taking the log of a negative number or zero. The conversion does not affect the substantive results. 27
Results
A list of variable definitions, means and standard deviations associated with the variables used in the estimation is given in Table 1 . The structural coefficients from the second stage of this estimation are presented in Table 2 . 28 Results from a simple OLS estimation of (6)- (8) are given in Table 2a for comparison. Since the results are virtually the same, I will discuss those results presented in Table 2 . 29
The coefficients on the FDA budget variables in all approval categories (6)-(8) are found to be significant. However, only in the case of generic approvals is the sign significantly positive. A positive coefficient implies that relaxing the budget constraint for the agency will lead to more generic approvals; a 1% increase in the agency's budget causes a 1.01% increase in the number of generic drug approvals. Furthermore, this result suggests that the budget restrictions during the 1980's only had a constraining effect on the number of generic approvals granted. For both the number of new brand-name drug approvals and the number of medical device approvals, the coefficients for the budget variable are significantly negative which implies that budget restrictions of the 1980's did not constrain the number of new brand-name drug approvals or medical device approvals. The negative coefficient 27 Different constant terms were also added to the dummy variables and did not alter the substantive results.
28 Regressing residuals lagged by one on residuals from the two-stage least squares procedure did not produce coefficients that were statistically significant. For expression (9) which contained a lagged endogenous variable, the lagged residuals and all the other predetermined variables in (9) were regressed on the residuals from the two-stage estimation. Once again, none of the coefficients were statistically significant. This suggests that the residuals from this procedure were not autocorrelated.
29 Since logarithms of all the variables are used, the resulting coefficients are then interpretted as elasticities. The result is also consistent with brand-name pharmaceutical firms opposition to legislative attempts to implement user fees for FDA services over the last twenty years. Branded firms feared that their fees would be used to facilitate the approval of generic drugs. 31 FDA approval decisions were also found to be responsive to congressional preferences.
For generic drug approvals, the preferences of the median legislator in the Senate committee was positive and significant at the .05 level, which suggests that the preferences exhibited on this committee influenced the FDA to approve more generic drugs. A 1% increase in the ADA score of the median Senate committee member causes a .61% increase in the number of generic approvals. The preferences of the House committee median were not significantly different from zero in (7). For new brand-name drug approvals, the preferences of the House subcommittee median were found to be significant but positive instead of negative, while the preferences of the Senate committee median were not significantly different from zero. The positive coefficient for HADA suggests that high ADA scores are associated with preferences for faster new drug approval. 32 For medical device approvals, the coefficient of the House subcommittee median's ADA score was not significantly different from zero and the coefficient of the Senate committee median's ADA score was significantly negative.
A 1% increase in the ADA score of the median Senate committee member causes a 2.3% 30 This was also a precursor to the generic drug industry scandal in which FDA officials were found guilty of taking bribes from generic firms and some firms were found to have submitted false data with applications.
31 Only recently have brand-name pharmaceutical firms agreed to support a temporary user fee program implemented by the FDA in return for a promise of a substantial reduction in the time required for FDA approval for new brand-name drugs. Upon breach of this promise, user fees will be dropped; however, no refunds will be provided.
32 High ADA scores could also reflect a congressional preference to increase the level of competition among drugs in the market and the supply of drugs available to consumers. decline in the number of medical device approvals.
The positive coefficient for the FDA budget variable and the importance of congressional preferences in the expression for the number of generic approvals support the theory of congressional control regarding generic approval activity. The negative coefficient for the budget variables and the more limited influence of congressional preferences in the expressions for brand-name drug approvals and medical device approvals support the existence of increased agency discretion in these approval categories. Given that brand-name drugs and medical devices represent the industries with the most stringent pre-market approval procedures, it is not surprising that the approval of these products entails a relatively high degree of agency discretion in contrast to the approval of generic drugs.
In addition to the congressional signals discussed above, FDA approval decisions are also responsive to variables representing feedback or signals from industry. The coefficients for the rate of return variables for both brand-name drug approvals in (6) and generic drug approvals in (7) are found to be positive and significant at the .l and .Ol levels, respectively. This may imply that an expectation by the FDA of market rewards for brand-name drug firms and generic drug firms influences the FDA to approve more brand-name drugs and generic drugs.33 The coefficient for rate of return variable for medical device approvals in (8) is not significantly different from zero.
The coefficients for the number of brand-name applications received in (6) and the number of generic applications received in (7) are positive and significant at the .05 and .01 levels, respectively. This implies that the more brand-name drug and generic drug applications received, the more approvals granted. The coefficients suggest that a 1% increase in brand-name drug applications causes a .73% increase in brand-name drug approvals while a 1% increase in generic applications causes a 1.03% increase in generic drug approvals.
Finally, the coefficient for employment in the medical device industry MEMP is positive and significant at the .0001 level which suggests that the FDA's expectation of this industry's growth via job expansion leads them to approve more medical device applications. In particular, a 1% increase in expected device industry employment causes a 6.53% increase in the number of medical device approvals. The coefficient for the number of em-33 This finding does not rule out the possibility that the drugs which are most profitable are the ones which serve the public interest.
ployees in the pharmaceutical industry PEMP although significant, is negative instead of positive. 34
The final set of signals to examine are those which proxy for consumer interests. New brand-name drug approvals are very responsive to the death rate variable UDTH in (6) which suggests that the agency's expectation of a reduced death rate associated with lifesaving drugs leads the FDA to approve more of these drugs. The coefficient which is negative and significant at the .01 level using a one-tailed test implies that a 1% expected reduction in the death rate causes a 2.45% increase in the number of new drug approvals. 35 The overall negative correlation between the death rate and the number of new drug approvals further suggests that the FDA exercises extreme caution in the case of drugs that will affect a large number of individuals with a given illness. The potential consequences of approving a harmful or dangerous drug for an illness that has a very high death rate and affects a large number of individuals will be much greater for the agency than the consequences associated with an illness affecting fewer individuals. 36 One might think that the FDA should grant more drug approvals for illnesses that affect greater numbers; however, this result reflects a distortion in approval activity caused by the existing structure of bureaucratic incentives to weigh type I error more than type II error.
Generic approvals in (7) are also found to be highly responsive to proxies for consumer signals. Price is a key concern for those consumer interest groups (such as AARP) seeking increased availability of generic drugs and the FDA appears responsive to these interests.
The coefficient representing the pharmaceutical price index is negative and significant at the .01 level using a one-tailed test which suggests that the agency's expectation of a reduction in the price index for pharmaceuticals influences the FDA to approve more generic drugs. 37/38 34 An explanation for this result is largely due to the growth of advertising and promotional activities for drugs even though the number of new drug approvals may have declined over time.
35 As an alternative to the death rate variable used above, the residuals from a regression of time on UDTH were used in another estimation to control for any time trends. The alternative variable produced similar results although the coefficient was slightly smaller in magnitude, -2.24, but still highly significant.
36 In addition, a lower death rate may be correlated with the set of existing remedies and hence the state of medical knowledge regarding a particular illness.
37 A one-period lagged price index variable produced a similar result. 38 The Bureau of Labor Statistics constructs its price indices for a sample of drugs. The sample is updated only when new drugs enter the market; however, the sampling technique In particular, a 1% expected reduction in the pharmaceutical price index variable causes a 1.55% increase in the number of generic drugs approved.
The FDA also demonstrates responsiveness to the safety concerns regarding the supply of generic drugs. The sign of the generic scandal variable is significantly negative which suggests that consumer concern over the safety and credibility of the existing generic drugs led the FDA to reduce the number of generic drug approvals between 1989-1991. Specifically, a 1% increase in the SCAN variable causes a 1.18% reduction in the number of generic drugs approved.
The degree of responsiveness of the FDA to these proxies for consumer interests in both the expressions for brand-name drug approvals and generic drug approvals is surprising and deserves further study which is beyond the scope of this analysis. Additional work should consider alternative variables which represent consumer interests to determine if the relationship between expected consumer feedback and agency approval activity is robust, particularly in the case of brand-name drug approvals. Also, measures which reflect consumer interests in the case of medical device approvals need to be developed. Death rates are not an appropriate gauge of the benefit associated with innovative medical devices because many of these devices increase the quality or duration of life, but do not prevent death. For instance, the hip replacement for Bo Jackson enabled him to continue his career in professional baseball which represents a quality of life enhancement. In another example, kidney dialysis prolongs life, but in many cases does not prevent ultimate death by kidney failure.
The size of the FDA's budget in (9) * is found to be responsive to a three factors. First, the coefficient for the lagged budget is positive and significant at the .01 level. A 1% increase in the lagged budget causes a .47% increase in the current budget. In addition, the coefficient for real GNP is positive and significant at the .01 level which suggests that during favorable economic times the FDA receives a higher budget and during unfavorable economic times, the FDA is penalized with a lower budget. A 1% increase in real GNP causes a .78% increase in the size of the FDA's budget. Finally, the size of the budget appears inversly related to the number medical device approvals over time. The coefficient is likely to understate the impact of new drug prices in the calculation of the producer price index for pharmaceuticals. In addition, the sampling method also reduces the likelihood of contemporaneous correlation with the endogeneous variable.
22
for medical device approvals is negative and significant at the .01 level. Although the coefficient for new drug approvals is positive and the coefficient for generic drug approvals is negative in (9), neither are significantly different from zero. Congressional ADA scores from the House and Senate oversight committees are also not significant determinants of the size of the FDA budget.
The coefficients discussed in Table 2 measure the direct effect of the specific determinant on the respective endogenous variable holding all other endogenous variables constant. Table   3 provides the reduced-form coefficients which show the total effect of any exogenous variable on an endogenous variable and allows for adjustments in the endogenous variables as a function of all the exogenous variables in the system. 39 For example, the direct effect of the generic scandal variable in (7) leads to a reduction in the number of generic approvals.
However, the indirect effect of the generic scandal via budget may have also decreased the number of new drug and medical device approvals. While the coefficients in Table   2 provide some information about the relationships among the endogenous variables, the reduced-form coefficients show the accumulation of both the direct and indirect effects of the predetermined variables on the endogenous variables.
All the coefficients presented in Table 3 have the same sign as in Table 2 . It is interesting to examine how the magnitudes of these coefficients changed allowing for adjustments in the endogenous variables in the system. Many of the coefficients showed reductions in their magnitude. Of the consumer signals, the coefficient for UDTH in (6) changed from -2.45 to -2.30, the coefficient for P1NDX in (7) changed from -1.55 to -1.48, and the coefficient for SCAN in (7) changed from -1.18 to -1.13. It is interesting to note note that the size of coefficient for death reduction due to drugs causes the largest percentage change in FDA approval activity. In addition, the total effect of the price index exceeds the signal associated with the generic scandal variable in (7).
The coefficient for HADA in the expression for brand-name drug approvals declined from .25 to .21. Both of the significant industry variables coefficients in (7) (generic approvals) have a smaller magnitude in Table 3 than in Table 2 . The coefficient for the number of generic applications GREC changed from 1.03 to .98; the coefficient for the rate of return for generic firms RRG changed from .35 to .34. Although both of these coefficients cause a smaller percentage change in the number of generic approvals in (7), the agency appears more responsive to the industry demand for generic approvals than to the profit picture of the industry.
An substantial increase is observed in the magnitude of the employment variable MEMP in (8) for the medical device industry which increased from 6.53 to 8.71. The size of the employment coefficient is particularly interesting as it suggests that growth of this industry in terms of expanded employment is of primary interest to the FDA.
With respect to the size of the FDA budget, the coefficient for lagged FDA budget in (9) increased from .47 to .57 suggesting that lagged budget is more strongly related to the agency's current budget. In addition, the coefficient for real gross national product in (9) increased from .78 to .96 suggesting that the state of the economy causes the largest percentage increase in the size of current FDA budget. Table 3 suggest that the decline in the death rate due to new drugs has some similar but smaller spillover effects on the number of generic drugs approved. The generic drug scandal appeared to be another variable which created some spillovers for both the number of new drug approvals and the number of medical device approvals.
Two other observations from

Conclusions
This paper has developed a theoretical framework to analyze the variability in FDA approval decisions and to investigate agency discretion among competing industries. The framework is a general one which can be used to test competing theories of agency behavior. This analysis shows that the FDA responds to a variety of external interests including congress, the regulated industries and consumers. More importantly, the agency's responsiveness to these interests appears to vary among the three industry approval activities. The pattern of variation implies that bureaucratic discretion is the highest for products with the greatest regulatory stringency, brand-name drugs and medical devices. In contrast, generic drug approvals appear to be constrained by the FDA budget restrictions during the 1980's.
For economists trying to understand regulatory decision-making, the analysis shows how regulatory agencies may respond to diverse sets of external interests. For instance, it appears that the FDA is more responsive to industry signals than any other signal in the case of medical device approvals since a % change in one of the industry signals led to the largest % change in device approval activity. In contrast, the FDA appeared very responsive to the proxy for consumer signals in the case of brand-name drugs since a % change in the consumer signal led to the largest % change in brand-name drug approval activity.
From the FDA's perspective, the threat of adverse feedback from consumers seems to dominate the complaints of the brand-name drug industry regarding regulatory delay.
Although adverse feedback has not played much of a role in past medical device industry approvals, recent concern regarding breast implants and faulty heart valves may shift the responsiveness of this agency from industry interests to consumer interests. Additional data will be required to examine this hypothesis more fully.
Consequently, it becomes a much more difficult exercise to show that any particular agency that regulates multiple industries is subject to either capture or congressional 
